Skip to content

Results:

1 - 10 of 13

Documents

October 19, 1956

Briefing on the Visit to China of Pakistani Prime Minister Suhrawardy (No. 3)

The premiers of Pakistan and China convene to discuss Taiwan, Pakistani-Chinese relations, Mao's leadership, and the Muslim population in China, among other issues.

May 19, 1965

Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Pakistan, 'Reactions to China's Nuclear Test'

Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Pakistan describes different responses of Pakistani government officials and foreign government diplomats in Pakistan regarding China's first nuclear weapons test.

March 6, 1953

Letter from the Embassy of Pakistan to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (No. 598-F-198/53)

The Embassy of Pakistan in China requests support and financial assistance to allow several Pakistani nationals to leave Xinjiang.

September 30, 1982

Information about the Visit of Indira Gandhi to the USSR

Description of meeting between Indira Gandhi and Soviet representatives. Both sides give similarly critical assessments of Pakistan policy on subcontinent, which both describe as destabilizing to the region. Soviets devote special time to the "dangerous character of military-political partnership between the United States and China," and Indira Gandhi expresses concerns over China's "machinations" against India, and notes the increasing influence of China and America on India's neighboring countries. Gandhi says that Indian-Chinese relations have not improved, due partly to China's position on the India-China border issue.

May 27, 1955

Summary of the Views of Afro-Asian Countries on the Taiwan Issue at the Afro-Asian Conference

The People's Republic of China maintains that the Taiwan issue was an internal issue of China, and it was the US who created tension by invading and occupying Taiwan.

December 7, 1985

Defense Intelligence Agency cable to [excised location], 'Pakistan-China: Nuclear Weapons Production and Testing'

A State Department telegram discussing the possible Chinese-Pakistani nuclear assistance and reports that Pakistan had acquired a nuclear weapon in October of 1985.

November 19, 1982

Henry S. Rowen, National Intelligence Council, to DDCI [Deputy Director of Central Intelligence McMahon], 19 November 1982, with attached memorandum from National Intelligence Council staffer [name excised], 'Pakistan'

Despite the concerns about sharing the ALR-69 radar warning receiver with Pakistan for fear of it falling into Chinese hands, CIA officials argue that failure to meet Pakistani demands would lead to a “serious blow to U.S. worldwide nonproliferation efforts.”

November 8, 1982

'Pakistan-US: Demarche on F-16 Equipment,' 11/8/82, with Memo from McMahon to Carlucci, 'Risk Assessment of the Sale of AN/ALR-69 Radar Warning Receiver to Pakistan,'1 1/8/82, and Excerpt from Natl Intel Est on Pakistan

With delivery of U.S. F-16 fighter-bombers imminent, Pakistan threatens to refuse delivery unless the U.S. agrees to include the ALR-69 radar warning receiver for the aircraft. CIA analysts have concerns that including this sensitive radar technology in the delivery of the F-16s would enable China, a close military ally of Pakistan, to obtain and study the device.

October 17, 1982

US Embassy Pakistan Cable 15696 to State Department, 'Pakistan Nuclear Issue: Meeting with General Zia'

The U.S. Embassy in Pakistan reports to the State Department on a meeting between Ambassador General Vernon Walters and President Zia. Walters returned to Islamabad to warn Pakistani officials that U.S. aid was in “grave jeopardy” after a link between the Pakistani program and Chinese technology was discovered. A U.S. military aid package, which included F-16 fighter-bombers, was also discussed.

June 4, 1982

Note for [name excised] from [name excised], 'State/INR Request for Update of Pak SNIE, and Assessment of Argentine Nuclear Program'

A planned update of the Special National Intelligence Estimate 31-32/81 concluded that Pakistan’s nuclear program was continuing and new evidence suggested a “significant” Chinese role in the design of the weapons. Despite this new evidence, CIA estimates suggest that the required amount of fissile material for weapons production would not be available as early as had been predicted, and that a Pakistani nuclear test was not imminent.

Pagination